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Trustworthy data repositories ensure the security of their collections. We argue they should also
ensure the privacy of researcher and human subject data. We demonstrate the use of a privacy
impact assessment (PIA) to evaluate potential privacy risks to researchers using the ICPSR’s
Researcher Passport as a case study. We present our workflow, and discuss potential privacy
risks and mitigations for those risks.
Introduction: Privacy Considerations in Digital Repositories
Digital repositories and collections are often characterized by their trustworthiness (Donaldson
& Conway, 2015; Colati & Colati, 2009; CRL, The Center for Research Libraries, 2007;
Corrado, 2019). A repository’s components that determine its trustworthiness include digital
object management, technical infrastructure, security, and organizational infrastructure (CRL,
The Center for Research Libraries, 2007). Audits of trustworthiness (e.g., ISO 16363:2012
(Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, n.d.); the earlier Trustworthy Repositories
Audit & Certification checklist (CRL, The Center for Research Libraries, 2007); CoreTrustSeal
(2019)) typically focus on evaluating a repository’s stability in service of its data contents: how
might a data depositor know that this repository can be trusted to host their digital objects?
We recognize that the security of a repository’s holdings is paramount, but suggest that
there is another aspect of trustworthiness that must also be considered: how a repository
handles and manages user data, and how this data handling may affect the privacy of both data
subjects and of researchers accessing the repository’s content. This data might range from email
addresses of user accounts; to institutional affiliation or other biographical information required
for access to sensitive data; to search histories, clickstreams, and other trace usage data. In
some regions repositories are legally required to consider the privacy of their users’ data in their
design. For example, Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) requires systems
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processing personal information, including repositories, to practice “data protection by design”
and “data protection by default” (European Parliament and Council, 2016), yet few frameworks
or checklists exist to assist repository managers in analyzing the privacy risks for researchers
accessing data in digital repositories. For instance, while the TRAC checklist (CRL, The Center
for Research Libraries, 2007) considers aspects of the repository’s organizational structure (e.g.,
financial sustainability, procedural accountability), it does not address repositories’ policies and
procedures for managing information that their users and processes generate.
In this paper, we present a method for conducting a privacy impact assessment of a digital
repository, demonstrated through application to the Inter-university Consortium for Political and
Social Research (ICPSR) “Researcher Passport” (Levenstein, Tyler & Bleckman, 2018). This
digital credentialing system would lessen the administrative overhead of accessing sensitive
or restricted data repositories by providing researchers with a “passport” valid for multiple
repositories. Because this system would require sharing and storing user data, a privacy
impact assessment was of paramount importance. We describe our workflow, privacy risks we
identified, and discuss design, technical, and policy mitigation strategies and recommendations
for digital repository credentialing systems. We believe this approach and findings could be
beneficial to other repositories or credentialing systems.
Background
Trustworthiness in repositories
Most research on trust in repositories has focused on how one might come to trust the
information in a repository rather than how a repository might trust a potential user. Research
toward this end has involved: developing an idea of a "Designated Community" that can better
assess the trustworthiness of data held in a repository (Donaldson, 2016); ascertaining levels
of trust in a specific document or dataset as opposed to the repository or fonds (Donaldson
& Conway, 2015; Yakel, Faniel, Kriesberg & Yoon, 2013); developing trustworthiness as a
function of the assessment of information sources (Hertzum, Andersen, Andersen & Hansen,
2002); defining trust as "lack of deception, determining data validity (or accuracy) and by
assessing the integrity of repositories" (Yoon, 2014, p. 31); and identifying correlation between
the level of trust with the levels of trust one has in the scientific equipment that produces the
data itself (Wallis et al., 2007).
Kelton, Fleischmann &Wallace (2008) focus on trust as helping to inform information-
related behavior beyond ascertaining the extent to which information in a repository can or
cannot be trusted: “What is needed is a change in focus from the attributes of the information
itself to the perceptions of the person who is using that information” (ibid, 371). The authors go
on to discuss the relationship and distinction between trust, credibility, expertise, competence,
and morality. A further shift in focus is warranted from the perceptions of the person using
the information to the perception about that person. This nexus of interrelated concepts is
important for digital repositories to consider, who need to better understand how they can trust
the expertise, competency, and credibility of a potential user of the information they store.
Tyler (2019) addresses the question of whom a restricted data repository is to trust, and
to what sorts of restricted data they might be trusted to access. An important concept carried
through this work is the relationship between one’s digital identity and one’s trustworthiness: an
authenticated digital identity must hold sufficient, persistent attributes that allow a repository to
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assess the trustworthiness of an individual. In this way, a digital identity can be configured and
programmed to function as an interoperable, automatic, and distributed shibboleth that facilitates
access to restricted data. These four facets of digital identifying trustworthiness are the starting
point for the further development of the Researcher Passport project which serves as a use case
for our Privacy Impact Assessment. But when it comes to trusting that rights to privacy are
protected in restricted data digital repositories and archives, it is not just the privacy of research
subjects and respondent data that needs to be better understood; the privacy of researchers who
access restricted data digital repositories and archives needs to be better understood as well.
Privacy in Repositories
Privacy aspects in the context of repositories have largely been considered from the perspective
of data subjects, i.e., how research data when made available might affect the privacy and safety
of respective human subjects (W. E. Miller, 1969; Bancroft, 1972; Tripodi, 1974; Hofferbert,
1976; Bond et al., 1978; Geda, 1979; Edsall, 1981; Clubb, Austin, Geda & Traugott, 1985).
More recent research focuses on the risks and rewards of archiving digital social science research,
especially qualitative social science research. Responding to the recent “deluge” (Borgman,
2012; Jeng, He & Chi, 2017) of digital scientific research data, much research addresses similar
ethical problems of protecting research subjects’ privacy and confidentiality in the context of
providing the long-term storage and archiving of that data to facilitate future access (Cliggett,
2013; Bishop, 2005, 2009; Parry &Mauthner, 2004; Goldman & Pyatt, 2013; T. Miller, Birch,
Mauthner & Jessop, 2012).
This research that takes seriously the privacy and confidentiality concerns of social science
data research archiving and looks to advance concrete, pragmatic solutions that attempt to
balance risks and rewards to privacy and confidentiality is closest to the research presented in
this current study. Striking a balance between the responsibility to participant privacy and the
responsibility to make social science research data available to the research community is at the
forefront of the ICPSR Researcher Passport project (Levenstein et al., 2018). However, a second
class of privacy risks in the context of data repositories, namely those for researchers who access
repositories with sensitive or contentious datasets have been considered less. We argue that
privacy risks of digital repositories and respective systems should be analyzed systematically and
holistically in order to ensure that those risks can be appropriately mitigated for all stakeholders
in the design, development and deployment of digital repositories.
In the larger field of information privacy, privacy impact assessments have emerged as a
procedural approach for identifying, tracking and mitigating privacy risks as part of a larger
effort towards privacy by design. Privacy by design is a paradigm for the identification of
privacy risks and their mitigation as part of the system design process (Cavoukian et al., 2009;
Langheinrich, 2001). Addressing privacy risks early in the design process allows for embedding
and integrating privacy protections into a system in ways that provide privacy protections
without negatively affecting other system requirements (Cavoukian et al., 2009; Danezis et al.,
2015), something that is much more difficult to accomplish once a system exists already (Schaar,
2010). A key aspect of privacy by design is data minimization, i.e., only collecting, processing
and sharing data that is actually needed (Gürses, Troncoso & Diaz, 2011). Data minimization
can be combined with a range of other privacy-enhancing technologies and organizational
measures to protect privacy of a system’s stakeholders (Danezis et al., 2015). Privacy impact
assessments (PIAs) constitute a systematic, proceducural approach for assessing privacy risks
of a system and developing respective risk mitigations (Wright, 2013). PIAs are increasingly
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common components of software and product development processes and privacy compliance
efforts (Wright &De Hert, 2012), Wright arguing early on that they should be mandatory (2011).
In many countries, PIAs have become a required or recommended step for the design of
information systems that process personally-identifiable information (PII) (Wright & De Hert,
2012). For instance, the E-Government Act of 2002 requires U.S. government agencies to
conduct PIAs in the development or procurement of systems processing PII. Europe’s GDPR
requires entities collecting or processing data in Europe to conduct a data protection impact
assessment when a new system is likely to pose privacy risks. In addition, the GDPR requires
entities to provide data protection by design and by default (European Parliament and Council,
2016). Despite the general prevalence of PIAs, little guidance and examples exist for the
assessment of privacy impacts in the context of digital repositories. We aim to fill this gap.
Privacy Impact Assessments for Digital Repositories
As discussed in the previous section, a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is a systematic approach
for determining privacy risks of an information system and mitigations for those risks (Wright,
2013). A PIA typically involves mapping a system’s information flows, determining what
privacy risks exist for users of that system, and recommending strategies to mitigate those
risks (Wright, 2013). PIAs are also used to determine legal compliance of the system: i.e.,
whether it adheres to the data privacy laws of the countries in which it operates. For digital
repositories, PIAs can be used to reveal potential risks to both a system’s data subjects and its
users. For this purpose, we adapted Wright’s PIA methodology (2013), which synthesizes best
practices for PIAs, into a PIA process consisting of five phases tailored for digital repositories.
Phase I: Threshold Assessment and Preparation
The first phase of any PIA process is to determine whether a PIA is necessary, and if so, who
should conduct the PIA and with what timeline, scope, and budget (Wright, 2013). If a system
collects PII about individuals, and/or if the information collected by the system could be used to
harm to these individuals, a PIA is typically warranted (Wright, 2013; Wright & De Hert, 2012).
Phase II: Repository Description and Information Flows
The second phase is to map the system’s components and information flows, i..e, what and
how information is collected, stored, processed, transferred, and made available in different
aspects of the repository or system of interest. This entails understanding and describing the
repository’s purpose, how the system works or will work, and the system’s stakeholders; the
information the repository collects from what stakeholder and why; how information is used or
processed; how this information is stored and managed (e.g., is it stored in a database, is there a
delete policy to delete information, can stakeholders update or delete their information from the
system); and which stakeholders can access what information, and under what circumstances.
Information flows can be identified through interviews with system designers, review of system
documentation, and hands-on use of the system (if it exists already). The goal of this phase is to
create a comprehensive overview of potentially privacy-sensitive information in a repository.
Importantly, this should include a full consideration of all stakeholders who might be data
subjects or access information. Stakeholders to consider include human subjects represented in
research data, researchers and users accessing the repository, data curators integrating data into a
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repository, and administrative and IT staff with potential access to the data.
Phase III: Privacy Risk Analysis
Once the system and its information flows have been mapped, the next step is to identify,
analyze, and characterize the potential privacy risks posed by the system. Assessing these risks
entails additional interviews with stakeholder groups to understand their perspectives regarding
the system, how they used or would use the system, and their privacy concerns and perceived
risks regarding the system. Different stakeholders, such as users, data subjects, curators, and
administrators may contribute quite different perspectives on potential privacy implications of
the system. Information flows and interview findings are then used to develop scenarios in
which information might be misused. The following questions are examples of those that might
be used to identify risk scenarios:
• This information is being used in this particular manner. How might this harm
stakeholders?
• This information is being collected in this way. How might this harm stakeholders?
• What are all the possible ways that this information could be used to harm stakeholders?
• What are the ramifications for a stakeholder that their information can be accessed by
another stakeholder?
• What are potential ways that outside entities can access the information contained in the
information flows? What are the consequences for the stakeholders involved?
• What are harms that might result from unauthorized access either by other stakeholders
or unauthorized parties?
In developing risk scenarios, Wright (2013) recommends assessing the likelihood a given
risk will occur, as well as the potential magnitude and severity of the risk. To assess legal
compliance, relevant privacy laws should be examined and then, alongside examination of the
information flows, it needs to be determined if the system complies with these laws.
Phase IV: Mitigation Strategies and Recommendations
After identifying risk scenarios and impacts, the next phase is to develop mitigation strategies.
These can be technical (changes to the system) or organizational (internal and external policies)
in nature (Danezis et al., 2015; Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009; Gürses et al., 2011). The
following questions are examples of those that might be used to identify risk mitigations:
• What is the root cause of the identified privacy risk?
• Is this risk caused by the collection of certain information? Can the system function if
this information is not collected or collected at a different level of abstraction?
• Is the risk caused by another entity accessing this information? Are there ways to prevent
that entity from accessing this information without compromising the system’s utility?
• Is this risk caused by a certain usage of certain information? Are there technical or
organizational measures that can be implemented to ensure that information is not used
this way?
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• Is the risk caused by unauthorized access to certain information? Are there ways to
minimize the chances of unauthorized access occurring?
It is advisable to confer with technical privacy experts and legal privacy experts to identify
potential mitigation strategies (Hoepman, 2014) and their appropriateness and feasibility. The
PIA should present a holistic view of recommended mitigation strategies to serve as consistent
guidance for system developers and designers. The PIA’s recommendations serve to evaluate and
prioritize among possible mitigation steps. An important aspect in providing recommendations
is to balance privacy considerations with system needs.
Phase V: Implementation, Publication, and Iteration
The PIA’s findings should be documented in a report which should provide clear and prioritized
recommendations to guide the implementation of privacy mitigations. The PIA report may also
be made public to make transparent the steps taken to consider and protect privacy in a given
system, which may positively affect the system’s trustworthiness. Importantly, a PIA report
should be a living document (Wright, 2013). The report should be frequently updated to reflect
the implementation of mitigations in the repository, and revisited as new features are added to
the system, and as new stakeholders, uses, information flows, and data types arise.
Case study: Privacy Impact Assessment of Researcher
Passports
To provide a better sense of how a PIA can be utilized in and improve the design of digital
repository systems, we present our privacy impact assessment of ICPSR’s Researcher Passport
system (Levenstein et al., 2018) as a case study. Early on in the project, we identified the need
for a PIA because the centralized management of researcher credentials entails substantial
collection, storage, and transfer of PII (Phase I). We formed an interdisciplinary team for the
PIA consisting of domain experts in digital repositories and privacy experts. Next, we first
provide an overview of the Researcher Passport system and its information flows (Phase II),
followed by our analysis of potential privacy risks for different stakeholders associated with the
proposed system (Phase III), and the mitigation strategies we developed to address those risks
(Phase IV). We finally summarize the recommendations and guidance for the development of
the Researcher Passports system (Phase V).
Researcher Passport: Overview and Information Flows
With more than 55 years of service to the social sciences, ICPSR is the largest archive of digital
social and behavioral science data in the world. ICPSR curates, preserves, and disseminates
original social science data for research, instruction, and policy evaluation. The organization
archives over 10,000 data collections comprising 250,000 files of data and documentation, with
millions of downloads each year. Membership has grown from 21 founding institutions in 1962
to more than 775 educational and research institutions worldwide in 2019.
As part of this work, ICPSR has established policies and best practices around the use of and
access to restricted data. In the current environment, restricted data are often available to the
research community only after a lengthy and complicated application process. Our prior analysis
of the application process for 23 repositories finds that these processes are inconsistent, not only
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Activity Data source
Initial stakeholder interviews (n=3) Project manager (1); Senior data project manager (1);
Application manager (1)
Expert interviews (n=4) FOIA officers (2); Privacy researcher (2)
System interaction Use of Archonnex; interaction with ICPSR website; res-
ulting memos on information flows
Second round of stakeholder inter-
views (n=8)
Potential users (3); Repository manager/"gatekeeper" (1);
Official Representative (1); ICPSR staff in charge of
managing data agreement infractions (3).
Table 1. Table summarizing the data collected in conducting the PIA process to determine the information
flows and privacy risks of the Researcher Passport system.
in what they require of researchers but even in how they define restricted data, modalities of
access, and responsible and trusted data users. The conditions under which researchers access
data depend on the interaction between characteristics of data, researchers, and institutions. This
process is burdensome both for those who try to make data available and for researchers trying
to use data. The complexity of the process creates opportunities for people and institutions to
hoard research data and refuse to share, under the guise of protecting confidentiality, or to claim
quite legitimately that it is simply too costly to share data safely.
Thus, the above has motivated efforts to develop the “Researcher Passport" system: a durable
and transferable digital identifier for researchers that stores information that data repositories
need to know, or need to verify, in order to make decisions about whether and how to provide
access to their data. Researcher Passports contain information such as a researcher’s education,
training, institutional affiliation, the datasets they’ve used appropriately in the past, and their
data security experience (Levenstein et al., 2018). The passport will represent and identify both
a level of trust a given researcher has earned in responsible data use as well as provide an
indication of which types of restricted data has earned requisite trust to access. Researchers
will use their passports to apply for access to restricted data at ICPSR, and specialized ICPSR
staff (gatekeepers) will review and update the passport when making access and dissemination
decisions.
To begin our PIA for the Researcher Passport system, we first interviewed key stakeholders
to begin identifying information flows. These stakeholders included the responsible project
manager; a senior data project manager; an application manager; and two Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) officers, as some information in the system may be subject to FOIA
requests. We also reviewed the project’s description (see Levenstein et al. (2018)) and security
assessments of ICPSR’s broader data repository management system, Archonnex. Finally, we
familiarized ourselves with the use and functionality of the Archnonex system, and in doing so
documented what information had to be provided during use, what information was displayed,
and any options for users to manage that information. See Table 1 for details.
The identified information flowswere documented through system flow diagrams visualizing
how information is transferred between different system entities and stakeholder. An exemplar
information flow is provided in Figure 1. We also created step-by-step process models showing
information exchanges in different parts of the system. For example, we described in detail
how a researcher creates a passport, how they enter information into the passport (and what
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Oracle Database (Password protected unencrypted) 
All passport information
+
Interaction data (information about how passport holders 
download datasets):
• Who is making a data set request (email address)
• What dataset is being requested
• Institution making request
• What files have been downloaded
• Manner in which files are downloaded
• Date and time files were downloaded
• Geographical location where download came from and
• IP address where download happened
• OS of computer that downloaded data
• Web browser that was used to download data
Official / Designated Representatives
Can access interaction data (individual and aggregate). No policy 
has been finalized, but presumably they would be able to access 
the passport information of passport holders at their member 
institution.
ICPSR Staff
Some ICPSR staff can access 
Oracle database and see 
passport information as well as 
interaction data. ICPSR staff 
that can do this are:
Google Analytics
Collects aggregate data on 
interaction data
Marketing Staff: Use data to to 
better market ICPSR and improve 
ICPSR service
Customer Service Staff: Use data 
to fix issues that customers face 
with the passports
IT Staff: Use data for 
troubleshooting and improving the 
OBRCS system.
Figure 1. Example information flow. Researcher information (e.g., name) will be transferred from a
researcher into a passport (since the passport collected researcher names). The passport would
transfer data into the database where this information would be stored and made accessible to
other stakeholders (e.g., ICPSR staff).
information is entered). A separate information flow was created to show how that information
is stored in a database, the features of that database, and who can access that database and for
what purposes.
The information flows were then used to prompt reflection on potential scenarios in which
there may be risks to the different stakeholders and users of the system. We also used these
information flows to develop interview protocols for additional stakeholders, to help us better
understand potential risks in the system. We then interviewed eight additional stakeholder
representatives (three potential users, a data repository “gatekeeper,” three ICPSR staff managing
data use agreements, one institution’s official representative).
Researcher Passport Privacy Risk Analysis
In Phase III, our analysis of the system’s information flows led to the development of twelve
risk scenarios in which stakeholders’ privacy could potentially be harmed. We grouped
these scenarios based on whether they primarily affect passport holders (S1–S4), affect both
passport holders and data subjects (S5–S8), primarily affect data subjects (S9–S10), or primarily
affect ICPSR (S11–S12). Risk scenarios are summarized in Table 2; see Appendix A for full
descriptions.
Scenario Harm Caused
S1 Past dataset infractions lead to (unfair?) blocking H1
S2 Passport holders’ research ideas are stolen by other researchers H3, H5
S3 Negative impact on passport holders career and reputation H3
S4 Passport holders targeted for working with specific sensitive
and politically-charged datasets
H2
S5 Erroneous information on passport H1, H4
S6 A numeric score inaccurately judging passport holders H1, H4
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S7 Bias against individual passport holders H1, H4
S8 Bias against passport holders of specific groups H1, H4
S9 Bad actors can use passport information to extract sensitive
datasets from passport holder machines
H4
S10 People using other people’s passports for applications allows
unauthorized access
H4
S11 ICPSR’s use of passport data decreases users’ interest in the
system
H5
S12 ICPSR’s lack of data retention policy for interaction data
decreases trust of system
H5
S13 ICPSR using passport information as an ‘edge’ over other
repositories
H5
Table 2. Table summarizing the identified risk scenarios.
Each risk scenario is associated with a potential harm – the specific privacy impact that
could befall a stakeholder. These include:
• H1: Passport holders being unfairly or mistakenly denied access to data.This could
impair passport holders’ ability to conduct research.
• H2: Physical or emotional harm to passport holders. Passport holders could be
targeted by “bad” actors, e.g., other researchers seeking to “scoop” a project or outside
groups targeting researchers working on politically-charged topics.
• H3: Reputational harm to passport holders. If a researcher is denied access to
restricted data, unfairly or not, they could be labeled as being untrustworthy.
• H4: Unauthorized access to human subjects data. If a researcher is inappropriately
granted access to human subjects data, this could potentially put human subjects at risk.
• H5: Distrust of Researcher Passport, and by extension, institutions that use it.Any
of the above harms coming to pass could cause researchers to lose trust in the Researcher
Passport.
We estimated the likelihood of these risks to generally be low – however, the severity of any
of these scenarios coming to pass could be high. In most scenarios, risks primarily impacted
passport holders (e.g., credentialing information could be used against the researcher or may be
exposed to others). Therefore, it is important to identify potential mitigation strategies to protect
users, and to thereby build trust in the Researcher Passport system.
Mitigation strategies
We developed a total of 17 mitigation strategies (see Table 3 for a summary; Appendix B
for full descriptions). These can be grouped into design solutions (M1–M3), policy solutions
(M4–M16), and technical solutions (M17).
Design and technical solutions all entail steps that could be “hard coded” into the Researcher
Passport system. Examples include allowing passport holders to annotate past infractions
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on their passports to provide further context; implementing multi-factor authentication; and
encrypting all passport data by default.
Policy solutions, on the other hand, involve changes to processes for working with data
or stakeholders both in and out of the Researcher Passport system itself. We grouped policy
solutions into three subgroups: dataset application solutions (M4–M6) passport holders’
rights policy solutions (M7–M11), and internal ICPSR policy solutions (M12–M16). Dataset
application solutions include changes that could be made to the process of applying for access
to a dataset (e.g. allowing users to opt out of automated decision making). Passport holders’
rights solutions entail giving passport holders control over their data or passports (e.g. allowing
them to delete past interaction data after a period of time, or providing them with a process to
appeal or request changes to records on their passport). Finally, ICPSR-level policy solutions
include a number of internal audits that could be run to ensure that information is correct, and
decision making processes are transparent and fair.
Mitigation Addresses
M1 Hide passport holder’s name from gatekeepers during application process S2, S7, S8
M2 Allow passport holders to add comments to explain infractions on passport S1, S6
M3 Implement multi-factor authentication S10
M4 Opt out of automated decision making S1, S5, S6
M5 Inform researchers of why a dataset application decision was made S1, S5, S6, S7, S8
M6 Have appeals process for decisions related to dataset applications S1, S5, S6, S7, S8
M7 Allow researchers to delete past dataset interactions from passport and
database after retention period.
S1, S2, S3, S4, S9
M8 Enable passport holders to opt out of ICPSRdata usage for non-application-
approval purposes
S11, S12
M9 Allow researchers to choose what of their passport information is shared S1, S2, S4
M10 Allow researchers to remedy past dataset infractions from passport S1, S3
M11 Have process for requesting correction of information on passport S1, S5, S6, S7, S8
M12 Audit policy for passport accuracy and veracity S5
M13 Audit policy for internal decisions regarding applications S7, S8
M14 Strict punishments against sharing of passports S10
M15 Have clear policy in place to know what to do in case of a passport data
breach
S2, S3, S4, S9, S10
M16 Have clear, transparent policies regarding ICPSR data usage, storage, and
retention
S11, S13, S12
M17 Encrypt database by default S2, S4, S9, S10
Table 3. Table summarizing the identified mitigation strategies.
Resulting Recommendations
Some of the identified mitigation strategies are more feasible or impactful than others. Our
resulting recommendations take these factors into account, as well as whether the mitigation
IDCC20 | Research Paper
AbrahamMhaidli et al. | 11
strategy raises additional concerns. Because the Researcher Passport system is still being
developed, some strategies cannot yet be fully implemented; however, they can be taken under
consideration in development and future design work.
We recommend that M3 (Implement multifactor authentication), M9 (Allow researchers to
choose what of their passport information is shared), and M17 (Encrypt database by default), be
directly adopted, given their relative ease or straightforwardness of implementation. We further
recommend that M15 (Have clear policy in place to know what to do in case of a passport data
breach) and M16 (Have clear, transparent policies regarding ICPSR data usage, storage, and
retention) be directly adopted, due to the large number of risk scenarios they address.
Several mitigation strategies require further development of policy and auditing procedures
by ICPSR. We thus suggest that ICPSR clearly articulate its stance on several key questions:
1. What information about past DUA infractions should the passport contain?
2. Should ICPSR allow passport holders to delete past dataset interactions after a set period
of time? Or perhaps, automatically delete data about past interactions? Offering this
option would not likely hurt ICPSR, but would increase the privacy, and therefore trust,
in the system.
3. Should passport holders be able to opt out of certain aspects of the Passport system, such
as automated decision making, etc.?
4. Will passport holders be allowed to remedy past DUA infractions? If so, how?
Discussion
Ourworkmakes several contributions for the digital curation community. First, other repositories
can use the workflow we adapt from Wright (2013), particularly as more institutions adopt
policies or laws intended to protect user data. Though our PIA focused on privacy risks to
researchers using a credentialing system for a digital repository, this method is appropriate for
identifying and mitigating privacy risks for any sensitive information, including personally
identifiable information (PII) about research subjects. Methods of restricting or preventing
access to PII often rely on the researcher or data depositor; the PIA could instead be used by
repository managers for a more centralized assessment of privacy risks.
Second, our PIA identified risks that may be present in other digital repositories – particularly
for those that host sensitive or restricted data. Other repositories relying on credentialing
services should consider mitigations for the risk of unfairly denying researchers access to data –
or to providing undue access to data. For instance, several of the mitigations proposed give users
control over what aspects of their passport are shared or enable them to annotate past infractions.
Allowing users control over their personal data and the ways in which it is shared will likely be
important for other repositories, particularly those in countries with legislation in place like
GDPR. Other mitigations, such as multi-factor authentication, can help repositories ensure that
only authorized users are accessing their materials. Especially when they host PII and sensitive
data, repositories have responsibilities to protect that data and manage access. MFA reduces
risks of data leakage or breach that result from password sharing or hacking.
The information flows and harms related to those flows that PIAs produce make it effective
for identifying privacy risks in distributed computing contexts. In the Researcher Passport
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context, a researcher’s PII is attached to a digital credential, which is passed between systems.
However, there are other systems in which research data is passed between different servers for
analysis or processing (e.g. multiparty computing), or in which research data stays in one place,
but other algorithms or analytical processes are given access to the dataset for computation (e.g.
the “non-consumptive research" paradigm as by the Hathi Trust Research Center (Jett, Cole,
Maden & Downie, 2016)). There are also numerous repositories in which sensitive data is
passed to a virtual digital enclave; though the enclave itself may be "safe" for the research data,
it is important to ensure that the enclave is safe for the user as well. In each of these contexts,
a PIA may help data and repository managers identify and mitigate potential risks to both
researchers and research subjects.
Finally, our work expands notions of trustworthiness for repository managers and users. A
trustworthy data repository should ensure the security of all information that flows through a
system— not just the data it disseminates. Ensuring the security of repository user data will
become more important as research data volume increases, funding agency data management
requirements develop, and repositories adopt credentialing systems like the Researcher Passport
or develop new digital “enclaves” dependent on user profiles.
Conclusion & FutureWork
Digital repositories need to consider the privacy of both data subjects and researchers. We
demonstrated how digital repositories can conduct a privacy impact assessment via a case
study of a researcher credentialing system. Three possible future directions for research
include considering ethical social science data archive and repository behavior from a social
justice lens, (Punzalan & Caswell, 2016) especially as privacy protection challenges become
increasingly complex, the focus on equitable agency, representation, restorative justice, and
community could prove helpful to ensuring continued balance is struck between privacy and
accessibility of research data, for both participants and researchers. Further, there is a need
to continue to address the risks and rewards of “Big Data” for social science research (Mills,
2018), especially the extent to which increased computational computing capabilities undermine
statistical-method-grounded methods for protecting data privacy and confidentiality. Finally,
there are possible avenues of research in understanding of restricted social science data archives
from a “socio-technical framework” perspective (Plale et al., 2019). The Researcher Passport
described in this paper is an example of such a “socio-technical framework” through which one
can understand restricted social science data archives. By paying attention to, and finding novel
solutions to, complex privacy, confidentiality, and policy relationships in-and-between the data,
the enclave, and the users, we hope to provide some contribution to the future of proper and
equitable restricted social science (re)use.
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Appendix A: Risk Scenarios
Risks to passport holders
S1: Past dataset infractions lead to (unfair?) blocking.Any Data Use Agreement
infractions would appear in a researcher’s passport. Applications for new datasets could be
unfairly or prematurely rejected based on those infractions if details about the infraction are
unavailable. The likelihood is moderate: the mere presence of an infraction could influence the
gatekeeper’s perception of the passport holder. The severity is moderate: passport holders may
not access datasets important for their research. However, passport holders with egregious data
misuses should not be allowed to access sensitive data.) The harm it leads to is H1.
S2: Passport holders’ research ideas are stolen by other researchers. The passport
stores what datasets a researcher has previously used and is currently working on. If a rival
researcher accesses a passport, they could know what datasets the researcher is currently
working on. The rival researcher may try to work with the same dataset and ‘scoop’ the original
researcher. The likelihood is moderate: research rivalry exists in academia. The severity is high.
The harms it leads to are H3 and H5.
S3: Negative impact on passport holders’ careers and reputations.Any Data Use
Agreement infractions would appear in a researcher’s passport. People in charge of hiring
decisions could request to see a job applicant’s researcher passport and use any negative
information to deny the passport holder a job or role. Similarly, leaked passports could harm a
researcher’s reputation if they contain negative information. For instance, researchers may be
reluctant to collaborate with that passport holder. The likelihood is low: the chances others will
be able to access the passport information is low; and moreover, chances are low people will
weigh passport credentials over other factors, such as number of publications, when evaluating
job applicants. The severity is moderate. The harm it leads to is H3.
S4: Passport holders targeted for working with specific sensitive and politically-
charged datasets.The passport stores what datasets a researcher has previously used and is
currently working on. Some of these datasets could be of politically charged or otherwise
sensitive topics (e.g., the U.S. Trans Survey). Entities could target researchers working on
specific topics, and information from the passport (such as address) could leave passport
holders vulnerable to attack if it is leaked. The likelihood is low: few passport holders work on
politically charged topics, and it is unlikely that entities could access this information. The
severity is high. The harm it leads to is H2.
IDCC20 | Research Paper
AbrahamMhaidli et al. | 17
Risks to passport holders and data subjects.
S5: Erroneous information on passport. Information on the passport may be inaccurate,
whether it was incorrectly entered or verified or has gone out of date. Incorrect passport
information could mean that either (1) passport holders are barred from accessing datasets they
should be able to or (2) passport holders are granted access to datasets they should not be able
to. The likelihood is low. The severity is high. The harms it leads to are H1 and H4.
S6: A numeric score inaccurately judging passport holders. One of the proposed
features of the passport is to have a numerical ‘score’ associated with the passport, calculated by
taking into account a passport holder’s credentials, past uses of datasts, etc. This score would be
used to determine access to datasets (the higher the score, the more sensitive datasets a passport
holder could access). Scores may be inaccurate measures of a passport holder’s trustworthiness –
however, the presence of the score may mean that gatekeepers default towards the score and
ignore other useful data that would be important to take into account. This in turn could mean
passport holders are unfairly granted or denied access to certain datasets. The likelihood is
moderate. The severity is moderate. The harms it leads to are H1 and H4.
S7: Bias toward individual passport holders.When reviewing an application, gatekeepers
can see an individual passport holder’s name. Gatekeepers could have personal relationships
with applicants that influence their decision. The likelihood is low: presumably, there would
be few cases of passport holders interacting directly with gatekeepers who have a personal
relationship with them. The severity is high. The harms it leads to are H1 and H4.
S8: Bias toward passport holders of specific groups.When reviewing an application,
gatekeepers can see an individual’s passport holder’s identity and may infer group characteristics
of the applicant (such as race, gender, religion, institutional affiliation, etc.). Gatekeepers could
have an explicit or implicit bias in favor or against certain groups that impacts their decisions
when approving or denying applications. The likelihood is moderate. The severity is high. The
harms it leads to are H1 and H4.
Risks to data subjects
S9: Bad actors can use passport information to extract sensitive datasets from
passport holders’ devices.The system stores interaction data (e.g., time at which dataset is
accessed, geographical location, IP address, browser used, email, name of passport holder). If
an actor gains access to this interaction data, the actor could use this data to help them attack a
passport holder’s device and extract datasest the passport holder possesses. The likelihood is
low. The severity is high. The harm it leads to is H4.
S10: People using other people’s passports for applications allows unauthorized
access. Individuals could steal account details of passport holders, or passport holders might
lend their passport credentials to others. Either scenario would allow unauthorized users to
access datasets. The likelihood is low. The severity is high. The harm it leads to is H4.
Risks to ICSPR
S11: ICPSR’s use of passport data reduces users’ interest in the system. ICPSR may
use passport data and interaction data in a number of ways (such as improving the service or
marketing ICPSR to institutions). Passport holders whose data is collected may not view these
data uses as legitimate, and may be uncomfortable with how their data is used. The likelihood is
low: ICPSR uses data only for marketing, troubleshooting, and improving ICPSR service; uses
that are probably not going to be seen as controversial by passport holders. The severity is low.
The harm it leads to is H5.
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S12: ICPSR’s lack of data retention policy for interaction data decreases trust of
system.The Researcher Passport system collects interaction data, and the time of analysis there
was no apparent data retention policy or ability for passport holders to delete past interaction
data. Passport holders may be uncomfortable with the idea that their interaction data is stored
indefintely. The likelihood is low. The severity is low. The harm it leads to is H1.
Appendix B: Mitigation Strategies
Design Solutions
M1: Hide passport holder’s name from gatekeepers during the application process
(addresses risks S2, S7, and S8) When passport holders apply to access certain datasets,
information that could be used to discriminate against passport holders should be hidden from
gatekeepers. The system would need to provide an anonymous channel for gatekeepers and
applicants to communicate while protecting identities. This design solution mitigates risks of
bias and could help protect researchers from being targeted for “scooping” attempts.
M2: Allow passport holder to add comments about infractions on passport (addresses
risks S1 and S6). Although all data agreement infractions are serious offenses, not all data
agreement infractions have the same severity: an accidental infraction (e.g., losing a laptop)
is different than a purposeful infraction (e.g., selling a dataset to a corporation). To highlight
the nuance of the different infractions, passport holders should be able to add comments to
contextualize their infraction. Passport holder comments should be prominent and visible to
ensure gatekeepers notice them (e.g., display comments in-line with infraction information,
in a clear, easy-to-read format and font size). This design solution does not guarantee that
information is accurate or that gatekeepers notice it.
M3: Implement Multi-Factor authentication (addresses risks S10. Multi-factor
authentication (MFA) requires users to present multiple pieces of evidence (e.g., password, PIN
number) to login to systems and could provide additional security overall. MFA would require
the collection of additional information (e.g., phone numbers), adds a step for passport holders,
and increases technical requirements (e.g., often requires a smartphone).
Policy solutions – dataset application process
M4: Allow passport holders to opt out of automated decision-making processes
(addresses risks S1, S5, and S6) . The passport system could automate access decision-making
for low-risk datasets. Passport holders may feel uncomfortable about having their access
to a database be determined by an algorithm or confused about why an algorithm rejected
their application. To alleviate their concerns, passport holders could opt-out of automated
decision-making. The option to opt-out could help increase trust with the system but would
decrease the efficiency of system.
M5: Inform passport holders of why a dataset application decision was made
(addresses risks S1, S5, S6, S7, and S8) . If a passport holder’s request for access to a restricted
dataset is denied, care should be taken to explain why. Either the gatekeeper or the automated
system should produce a detailed report that passport holders could then access. Passport
holders should also receive information about how to remedy the problems with their application
and reapply, if applicable. This would increase the accountability and trust of the system and
surface biases or unfair approval/rejection practices.
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M6: Have an appeals process for application decisions (addresses risks S1, S5, S6, S7,
and S8) . When applications are denied, passport holders should be able to appeal the decision.
Passport holders could include the decision report and present their case. A second gatekeeper
would weigh both arguments and make a final decision. In case the decision was automated,
passport holders could request human review. This would add accountability to the system and
reduce the chances of unfair rejections. It also generates additional work for gatekeepers.
Policy solutions – passport holders’ rights
M7: Allow researchers to delete past interaction data and dataset interactions from
passport and database after retention period. (addresses risks S1, S2, S3, S4, and S9) .
Currently, information on past dataset uses and interactions is stored in a database, without
an apparent data retention policy. Passport holders could be given the option to delete such
interactions after a substantial amount of time has passed (e.g., 5 years). Passport holders could
either check a global option under account settings (e.g., “Delete all past data interactions after 5
years”), or could review individual interactions with datasets and delete each interaction one by
one. Alternatively, this could be an automatic policy whereby all data interactions are deleted
after a certain period of time, with sensitive (or politically charged) datasets being deleted
sooner. This would allow passport holders to delete past dataset interactions which could be
sensitive or put passport holders at risk, mitigating potential harms to them, and would increase
trust with system. On the other hand, Past interactions never 100% fully gone (some evidence
of interactions could remain, such as email conversation between gatekeepers and passport
holders); interaction data could be valuable to ICPSR for improving service purposes, and if
enough people delete past data, this could impact ICPSR.
M8: Enable passport holders to opt out of ICPSR data usage for non-application-
approval purposes (addresses risks S11 and S12) . Passport holders should be given the option
to opt out of (or opt into) their data being used by ICPSR for non-application related purposes
(e.g., marketing, or improving ICPSR service). Passport holders should be informed of these
options when they first create an account, and be allowed to conveniently change their choice
(for example, by having a button to opt in / opt out under ‘Settings’). Moreover, this option
should not limit or prevent passport holders from using the Researcher Passport system as
normal. This would grant passport holders autonomy over how their data is used – which, in
turn, would increase trust with the system. On the other hand, if too many passport holders opt
out, then ICPSR may find it difficult to market or improve their service.
M9: Allow researchers to choose what of their passport is shared (addresses risks S1,
S2, and S4) . Passport sharing with passport holders and gatekeepers is currently a binary choice
– either all the passport is shared, or none of it is. This could worry passport holders who want to
share some parts of their passport (such as completion of a certain badge) but hide others (such
as CV, or past datasets worked with). Providing passport holders with the options to choose
what parts of their passport to share with others could be a step to solving this, so that passport
holders could share useful information while withholding sensitive information they do not want
to share. There are many ways this could be implemented. One way could be to allow passport
holders to select in their profile what information is ‘visible’ information and what information
is ‘private’: when a passport is shared, only the ‘visible’ information is shared. Another
approach could have passport holders, when sharing their passport with someone else, fill a
checkmark list where they can select what items of information are to be shared and which ones
are not to be shared. This ability to limit what information is shared or kept private should not
extend to gatekeepers: otherwise, passport holders could withhold information that gatekeepers
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need to make an accurate decision about an application. This would increase trust with system,
and allow sensitive or otherwise reputation-damaging information to be kept hidden.
M10: Allow researchers to remedy past dataset infractions from passport (addresses
risks S1 and S3) . To avoid the consequences a past data infraction might have on a passport
holders career, passport holders could be offered the chance to expunge past dataset infractions
from their record and remove it to their record permanently. This “expunging” could happen
automatically after a substantial time has passed (e.g., 10 years), or done by a passport holder
after taking remedial action to prove that they are capable of handling data responsibly (e.g.
undergoing extensive training on how to handle data securely). Additionally, the remedial action
could change and adapt to the context and circumstances of the infraction: for infractions of
the type of accidentally losing a laptop computer with sensitive data, one type of training is
required; but for other infractions a different training is used. For more severe infractions (e.g.,
deliberately leaking sensitive data; attempting to re-identify data subjects), it could be that there
is no expunging mechanism. This would prevent remediable infractions from the past from
permanently affecting passport holder. On the other hand, it is unclear if remedial courses
or trainings completely ‘makes up’ for past dataset infractions; additionally, some extremely
sensitive datasets might be too sensitive even for people who have expunged their record.
M11: Have process for requesting correction of information on passport (addresses
risks S1, S5, S6, S7, and S8) . A lot of the information in the passport is entered manually by
passport holders. Some information, such as credential information, needs to be verified or
pulled in by outside entities before being present on a passport. Other information gets added
by the system not the passport holder (such as past dataset infractions). If there is incorrect
information on a passport, the passport holder should be able to request correction of that
information. In the case of credential information that needs to be verified, passport holders
could ask it to be verified again. In the case of information that is not added by the passport
holder, passport holders could appeal for it to be corrected, in which case the information would
be reviewed by a human entity (e.g., dedicated ICPSR staff). This would reduce the chances of
incorrect information being present in passport. On the other hand, it could add extra burden for
staff and verification services.
Policy solutions – internal to ICPSR
M12: Audit policy for passport accuracy and veracity (addresses risk S5 . To ensure
that passport holder entered data on the passport is accurate, ICPSR should have audit policies
that review the information in a passport and ensure it is up-to-date. This could be done in
several ways, for instance, by contacting the institution the passport holder claims to belong to;
verifying that publications exist; or interviewing the passport holder directly and contrasting
their answers with what appears in their passport. The verification mechanisms should be
periodically reviewed and audited. If verification mechanisms are found to be faulty (e.g.,
exhibit high false positive rates), then alternate verification methods should be found. Auditing
the verification processes could involve having designated staff interview and carefully examine
the verification mechanisms; alternatively, staff could try to create a fake passport with fake
credentials, and see whether the verification mechanisms are able to detect the fraud. This
would ensure that passport information is accurate. On the other hand, any auditing process
is likely to be expensive and time-consuming, placing extra burden on staff; and it could be
privacy invasive or otherwise inconvenience passport holders.
M13: Audit policy for internal decisions regarding applications (addresses risks S7
and S8) . With the advent of the passport system, it will be easy to track who has made what
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requests, and whether these requests have been approved or rejected. The passports could
facilitate internal auditing to check and see whether applications are approved or rejected in
a fair fashion. For example, the data collected about what datasets passport holders have
requested could be used to check if disparities exist between rates at which passport holders
from community colleges get rejected vs. Ivy leagues – if a disparity is found, then the matter
could be investigated more in depth to see if there is an unfair bias in the approval process. To
perform this, an auditing policy could be in place where once a year all the application decisions
are reviewed, and the application approval rates of different groups could be compared (e.g., ivy
league colleges vs. community colleges). More ambitiously, ‘fake’ passports could be created
that are exactly the same in terms of credentials but differ in group affiliation (e.g., a female
sounding name vs a male sounding name) and seeing whether applications are approved at
the same rates. This is an approach that has been used to evaluate differences in job offers
for resumes of individuals belonging to different groups, such as white sounding names vs
black sounding names. This approach would require gatekeepers to take time evaluating false
applications, so it might not be the optimal approach. This would increases accountability and
inclusion of system, as well as increase trust with system. On the other hand, such an auditing
process is likely to be expensive and time consuming, and it could place additional burden on
gatekeepers and ICPSR staff.
M14: Strict punishments against sharing of passports (addresses risk S10 . To address
issues of passport holders sharing their passport with others to allow them to access datasets,
there could be a policy in place to punish and mitigate this behavior. For example, passport
holders who share their passport could have a mark on their passport. SImilarly, passports that
have been found to be shared could have to go extra verification steps before being approved for
requests. These policies should be made explicit to passport holders, to discourage passport
sharing. This would reduce the chances of passport sharing and associated harms. On the other
hand, this strategy does not address the issue of detecting when passport sharing is occuring (this
mitigation only addresses passport sharing after it has been discovered); it would be difficult to
differentiate between voluntary sharing of passport versus unauthorized access to passport;
and the addition of this negative mark on passport can raise new risks (e.g., S1 (Past dataset
infractions lead to (unfair?) blocking) or S3 (Negative impact on passport holders career and
reputation)).
M15: Have clear policy in place to know what to do in case of a passport data breach
(addresses risks S2, S3, S4, S9, and S10) . In cases that passport information is leaked to
external sources, there should be policies in place to inform actions ICPSR should take so as to
mitigate harms. Such policies should include mechanisms so that the passport holders whose
information is leaked are informed of the breach, and passport holders are given information
regarding what data has been exposed, the risks that the exposure has for the passport holders,
and what steps (if any) passport holders can take to mitigate the consequences of the breach.
This would help reduce the fallout in case of a data breach or data exposure.
M16: Have clear, transparent policies regarding ICPSR data usage, storage, and
retention (addresses risks S11, S12, and S13) . ICPSR should have clear and transparent
policies regarding its data practices. Additionally, ICPSR should inform what these policies are
to passport holders in ways that are clear, readable, and understandable. Care must be taken
to ensure such policies comply with relevant state and country laws. This transparency can
help reduce the uncomfortableness of passport holders over how their data is used, stored, and
managed, and the increased transparency would increase trust in the system.
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M17: Encrypt database that stores passport information by default (addresses risks
S2, S4, S9, and S10) . Currently, the database that houses passport information and interaction
data is password protected, but not is encrypted. We advocate encrypting it by default, since this
reduces the chances of unauthorized access to information within the database. This would
reduces the chance of unauthorized access to passport information and interaction data.
IDCC20 | Research Paper
